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Abstract. In the last decade, the use of fast flux technique has be-
come established as a common practice to organise botnets in Fast Flux
Service Networks (FFSNs), which are platforms able to sustain illegal
online services with very high availability. In this paper, we report on
an effective fast flux detection algorithm based on the passive analy-
sis of the Domain Name System (DNS) traffic of a corporate network.
The proposed method is based on the near-real-time identification of
different metrics that measure a wide range of fast flux key features;
the metrics are combined via a simple but effective mathematical and
data mining approach. The proposed solution has been evaluated in a
one-month experiment over an enterprise network, with the injection of
pcaps associated with different malware campaigns, that leverage FFSNs
and cover a wide variety of attack scenarios. An in-depth analysis of a
list of fast flux domains confirmed the reliability of the metrics used in
the proposed algorithm and allowed for the identification of many IPs
that turned out to be part of two notorious FFSNs, namely Dark Cloud
and SandiFlux, to the description of which we therefore contribute. All
the fast flux domains were detected with a very low false positive rate;
a comparison of performance indicators with previous works show a re-
markable improvement.
Keywords: automated security analysis, malware detection, network
security, passive traffic analysis, botnet, fast flux
1 Introduction
During the last few years, the number of cyberattacks with relevant financial
impact and media coverage has been constantly growing. As a result, many
companies and organizations have been reinforcing investment to protect their
networks, with a resultant increase in the research on this topic [1].
Over the last two decades, botnets have represented one of the most promi-
nent sources of threats on the internet: they are networks of compromised com-
puters (popularly referred to as zombies or bots), which are controlled by a
remote attacker (bot herder). Botnets provide the bot herder with massive re-
sources (bandwidth, storage, processing power), allowing for the implementation
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of a wide range of malicious and illegal activities, like spam, distributed denial-of-
service attacks, spreading of malware (such as ransomware, exploit kits, banking
trojans, etc.) [16,18,19,20,22].
A common practice for bot herders is to organise their bots in Fast Flux Ser-
vice Networks (FFSNs): some bots, chosen from a pool of controlled machines,
are used as front-end proxies that relay data between a (possibly unaware) user
and a protected hidden server. The technique behind these structures is the
fast flux, i.e., the rapid and repeated changing of an internet host and/or name
server resource record in a Domain Name System (DNS) zone, resulting in rapid
changes of the IP addresses to which the domain resolves. FFSNs make the
tracing and the recovery of all the infected components extremely difficult, thus
allowing for a very high availability for illegal online services related to phish-
ing, dumps stores, and distribution of ransomware, info stealers, and click fraud
[21,26,28,32,33,35].
FFSNs have been known to cybersecurity experts for more than one decade
[22,32], but in the last few years it has been obtaining a spotlight [17,18,20,24,31,34].
The renewed interest is related to the studies of large botnets (e.g., Dark Cloud,
also known as Zbot network, and the most recent SandiFlux) which make mas-
sive usage of fast flux [2,21,25]. The standard approach to FFSNs detection is via
the so-called active DNS analysis, i.e., by actively querying some domains and
by collecting and analysing the answers: this strategy has been widely explored
and allows for extensive analyses of botnets [17,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29].
Instead, the algorithm described in the present work relies on passive anal-
ysis of the DNS traffic of a single network: it detects the fast flux domains
without interaction with the network traffic, thus making the algorithm com-
pletely transparent inside and outside the monitored network; in particular, it
cannot be uncovered by the attackers, who often control the authoritative name
servers responsible for responding to DNS queries about their fast flux domains
[30]. The proposed detection approach has been evaluated in a 30-day-long ex-
perimental session over the network described in Sect. 5. The performance is
much higher compared to a state-of-the-art analogous method [33]. Moreover,
the analysis was performed near-real-time: the average execution time of the
algorithm was 25 seconds, while the average time between two subsequent runs
of the algorithm was 3 minutes (see Sect. 3 for more details), meaning that the
average detection time for fast flux domains was less than 2 minutes.
As an additional test of the proposed approach, we examined the IPs —
collected via active DNS analysis — associated with a list of fast flux domains
gathered from [3,4,5,6]. This investigation confirmed the reliability of the metrics
used in the fast flux detection method proposed herein and allowed for the
identification of more than 10000 IPs, some of which are likely associated with
compromised hosts, which turned out to be part of two notorious botnets, namely
Dark Cloud and SandiFlux, to the description of which we therefore contribute.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we discuss the most relevant
features of FFSNs, with an outline of related works. In Sect. 3, we briefly describe
aramis, the monitoring platform that contains the fast flux detection method
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which is the focus of this paper and which is described thoroughly in Sect. 4.
Section 5 comprises a detailed discussion of the experimental results of the test
of the proposed algorithm, while Sect. 6 contains further investigations on the
FFSNs underlying some fast flux domains. Finally, we discuss possible future
developments in Sect. 7.
2 Background and Related Work
One of the first works providing an overview of the fast flux attacks was the
Honeynet project [32]. In order to explain hidden operations executed by botnets,
authors gave examples of both single and double fast flux mechanisms: while the
first rapidly changes the A records of domains, the latter frequently changes
both the A records and the NS records of a domain. The interested reader can
find a review and a classification of fast flux attacks in [35].
Content Delivery Network (CDN) and Round-Robin DNS (RRDNS) are le-
gitimate techniques which are used by large websites to distribute the load of
incoming requests to several servers. The response to a DNS query is evaluated
by an algorithm which chooses a pool of IPs from a large list of available servers
whose number can be of the order of thousands (see Sect. 6 for some examples).
As a result, the behaviour in terms of DNS traffic is very similar to the one of
a FFSN, and indeed CDNs and RRDNSs represent the typical false positives in
fast flux detection algorithms [22,26,33].
A large number of approaches have been proposed to detect FFSNs and to
distinguish them from legitimate CDNs and RRDNSs. Most of them rely on
active DNS analysis, which allows for the collection of a large number of IPs
associated with a domain, thus simplifying the FFSNs detection, but they re-
quire the resolutions of domains that may be associated with malicious activities
[20,22,24,26,28]. These methods, despite being appropriate for a deep analysis of
FFSNs, have relevant drawbacks in implementations oriented to the monitoring
of corporate networks [30,33].
Some FFSN detection methods based on passive DNS analysis have been
proposed. Some of them analyse the DNS traffic of a whole Internet Service
Provider (ISP), thus taking in input the DNS traffic generated by many differ-
ent networks. Perdisci et al. [30], in particular, performed a large-scale passive
analysis of DNS traffic. They extract some relevant features from the DNS traffic
and classified the domains via a C4.5 decision tree classifier. Berger et al. [18]
and Stevanovic et al. [34] proposed two other approaches to analyse the DNS
traffic of an ISP. Both methods are based on a tool called DNSMap and classify
the bipartite graphs formed by the collected fully qualified domain names and
the associated IPs. The first method searches for generic malicious usage of DNS,
while the latter focuses on FFSNs.
Soltanaghaei and Kharrazi [33], finally, proposed a method for passive DNS
analysis of a network which requires a history for each domain to be evaluated
and achieved 94.44% detection rate and 0.001% false positive rate in their best
experiment. Our algorithm employs a similar approach, but, with a more careful
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choice of the metrics achieves better results, while performing a near-real-time
analysis (see Sects. 4 and 5 for details).
3 aramis
The proposed fast flux detection technique is included in a commercially avail-
able network security monitoring platform called aramis (Aizoon Research for
Advanced Malware Identification System) [7,19]. This software automatically
identifies different types of malware and attacks in near-real-time, it is provided
with dedicated hardware1, and its structure can be outlined in four phases:
1. Collection: sensors located in different nodes of the network gather data,
preprocess them in real-time and send the results to a NoSQL database.
2. Enrichment: data are enriched in the NoSQL database using the information
obtained from the aramis Cloud Service, which collects intelligence from var-
ious open-source intelligence sources and from internally managed sources.
3. Analysis: stored data are processed by means of two types of analysis: (i)
advanced cybersecurity analytics which highlight specific patterns of attacks,
among which Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) [19] and fast flux,
and (ii) a machine learning engine which spots deviations from the usual
behaviour of each node of the network.
4. Visualization: results are presented in dashboards to highlight anomalies.
The cycle of the four phases restarts after a time ∆t which slightly depends
on the traffic flow analysed and amounts to 182 ± 36 seconds on the network
described in Sect. 5. A time ∆t of this magnitude is the best trade-off between
the near-real-time requirement and the need of a large amount of data in order
to have statistically significant results.
4 Detection Method
The aim of the proposed detection method is the near-real-time identification
of malicious fast flux via the passive monitoring of the DNS traffic of a single
network. To this purpose, the method is composed of three steps of analysis. (i)
Filtering: queries which are known to be non-malicious (e.g., popular domains,
known CDNs, local domains, etc.) are removed. (ii) Metrics identification: some
key indicators are calculated over the queries remaining after filters. (iii) Identi-
fication: the metrics are used to identify malicious fast flux among the queries.
The three steps have been constructed by combining information on the FF-
SNs — acquired from the literature — with a simple but effective mathematical
and data mining approach. The parameters of the model have been estimated
over a validation set formed by 30-days of DNS traffic captured from the net-
work described in Table 1, and by 12 pcaps associated with different malware
campaigns that leverage FFSNs, collected from the public repository [8].
1 E5-2690 2.9GHz x 2 (2 sockets x 16 cores) 16 x 8GB RAM, 1.1TB HDD
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Table 1. Validation-network description
30-days total one-hour average
N. of machines 261 -
N. of connections 80 M 111 k
N. of resolved A-type DNS queries 12 M 17 k
N. of unique resolved A-type DNS queries 381 k 527
4.1 Filters
The algorithm receives resolved DNS requests of type A (which return 32-bits
IPv4 addresses, in accordance with [9]) collected near-real-time from the mon-
itored network. The first step consists in the application of the filters reported
in Table 2 to the retrieved queries.
Table 2. Filters description
Type Description
White list domains
Domains known to be trusted, e.g., the ones associated with crypto
currencies (if their use is allowed in the network): the underlying
peer-to-peer networks are, in many respects, similar to botnets.
Popular domains
Top 100 domains collected inside the network under analysis, web
URLs of the 500 world biggest companies provided by Forbes [10]
and top 10000 domains in the world provided by Alexa [11].
Configuration
words
Domains containing certain substrings (e.g., related to network
system and structure) represent congenital traffic.
Overloaded DNS
In order to provide anti-spam or anti-malware techniques, DNS
queries are sometimes overloaded, thus causing possible noise.
Local and
corporate domains
These domains represent a high percentages of the legitimate DNS
traffic in a corporate network.
CDNs and
RRDNSs
These are the most common sources of false positives in fast flux
detection algorithms; aramis (see Sect. 3) includes a function (with
a structure similar to that of the proposed fast flux detection
algorithm) which periodically updates a white list with the main
CDNs and RRDNSs detected in the monitored network, thus
allowing for a substantial speed up.
Queries with large
TTL
According to the literature, malicious fast flux are characterised by
a short TTL [22,28,33], therefore queries with a TTL larger than
1800 s are filtered.
4.2 Metrics Identification
The DNS requests that survive the filters described in Sect. 4.1 are integrated
with the history of the previous 30 days, saved locally. This allows for a more
accurate evaluation of the behaviour of the domains, however an assessment is
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already possible when the first answer is received. Among the remaining domains
there are many new emerging CDNs2 and, in order to distinguish them from
the FFSNs — which is the main challenge in malicious fast flux detection — we
identified some key indicators. Some of these indicators can be already evaluated
after a single query (we call them static metrics), while others need a certain
history (history-based metrics). The information regarding Autonomous Systems
(ASs) and public networks used in the following metrics are retrieved from [12].
Static Metrics. The metrics described in this section are evaluated over all
the IPs collected.
Maximum Answer Length. A relevant metric for the detection of malicious
fast flux is the number of IPs returned in a single A query. In particular, we
consider the maximum mal of such value: a malicious fast flux is believed to
typically have a mal larger than a legitimate fast flux [22,35].
Cumulative Number of IPs. Malicious fast flux typically employ a larger num-
ber of IPs (nIP) compared with CDNs, due to the lower reliability of each single
node [33].
Cumulative Number of Public Networks. Since the botnet underlying a ma-
licious fast flux contains infected machines which are typically distributed quite
randomly in different networks, the same is expected to be true for the IPs
retrieved by the related queries [22,35]. For this reason a malicious fast flux
typically has a number of public networks (nnet) larger than a legitimate CDN.
Cumulative Number of ASs. For the same reason described above, FFSNs
typically have a number of ASs (nAS) larger than legitimate CDNs.
AS-Fraction. The analysis of some preliminary fast flux pcaps revealed that,
despite being in general very useful, in some cases the absolute number of AS
was not a distinctive feature, while its ratio with the number of IPs was more
appropriate. For this reason we defined the metric
fAS =
nAS − 1
nIP
, (1)
which quantifies the degree to which the IPs are dispersed in different AS. This
quantity takes values from fAS = 0 (when all the IPs are in the same AS) to
fAS ∼ 1 (when each IP is in a different AS and the number of IPs is large).
In order to preserve these properties and to encode the additional information
about the typical scales associated with nAS for CDNs and FFSNs respectively,
we rescaled fAS as described below. The first rescaling is
3
x −→ θ(nAS − n0)
[
1− e−
(
nAS−n0
s
)2]
x, (2)
where x = fAS, θ(t) is the Heaviside step function (i.e., θ(t) is 1 for positive
t and 0 otherwise), s is a scale representing the average number of ASs in a
2 The filter mentioned in Table 2 detects a CDN only when it has a sufficient history.
3 Hereafter, the left and right hand sides of the arrow represent the quantity before
and after the rescaling respectively.
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typical CDN and n0 is a threshold for nAS below which the behaviour is not
suspicious from the viewpoint of the number of ASs.4 The rescaling in Eq. 2
reduces fAS when its value is comparable with the nAS expected in a CDN. The
second rescaling applies Eq. 2 to the quantity x = 1 − fAS and reduces it (i.e.,
increases fAS) when nAS is comparable with that of a typical FFSNs. In this
case the scale s represents the average number of ASs in a typical malicious fast
flux, while n0 is a threshold for nAS below which we do not increase fAS.
5
IP-Dispersion. The analysis of the distribution of the retrieved IPs is another
way to understand to which degree the structure underlying FFSN is random
and chaotic. We transform the set of the n IPs associated with each query into
the corresponding positions in the 32-bits IPv4 address space x1, ...xn,
6 and we
define
dIP =
1
ln
median(∆x), (3)
where ∆x = {xi − xi−1}ni=2, the {xi} have been ordered so that xi ≥ xi−1, and
ln is the average distance if the n IPs were uniformly distributed in the whole
public IPs address space. The IP-dispersion takes value from dIP = 1 (i.e., when
the IPs are uniformely distributed) to dIP = 0 (i.e., when the IPs are clearly
subdivided into a few clusters of close addresses). A similar idea was used by
Nazario et al. [28], who evaluated the average distance among the {xi}, but their
metric is more sensitive to outliers and it is not normalised in the interval [0,1],
which is crucial to combine it with the other metrics, as described in Sect. 4.3.
The FFSNs analysis described in Sect. 6 confirmed that the indicator in Eq. 3
is able to catch the key distribution properties of IPs in a FFSN.
History-Based Metrics. The history is constructed by subdividing the queries
retrieved from the monitored network in subsequent chunks: each chunk contains
at least 10 queries and spans a time interval of at least one hour; these two con-
ditions are the minimal requirements to make the metric definitions meaningful
from a statistical point of view. The metrics described in this section are evalu-
ated only if it is possible to construct at least two chunks.
Change in the set of IPs. It is a common belief that, while a CDN typically
returns IPs taken from a stable IP-pool, a malicious fast flux employs the avail-
able nodes in the FFSN, which often evolves quickly, and therefore its IP-pool
changes from time to time [22,35]. We defined a metric which measures in a very
simple way the change in the IP-pool:
cIP =
nIP
ncIP
− 1, (4)
4 We set s = 2.5 and n0 = 3; the first is the average nAS for the top 4 largest CDNs
detected in the validation set, while the latter is half the minimum of nAS detected
for a fast flux in the validation set.
5 We set s = 40 in agreement with Ref. [35], which states that a typical FFSN has a
set of IPs distributed among 30–60 ASs, and n0 = 5, which is the maximum number
of ASs detected for a CDN in the validation set.
6 To each IP n1.n2.n3.n4 we associated x = 256
3 n1 + 256
2 n2 + 256n3 + n4.
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where ncIP is the number of unique IPs present in the chunk averaged over all
chunks, while nIP has been defined in Sect. 4.2. This quantity takes the value
cIP = 0 when all the IPs are found in each chunk, i.e., when the IP-pool is stable
and it is explored completely in each chunk (and therefore ncIP = nIP). On the
other hand, if the IP-pool changes substantially from one chunk to the other,
the total number of IPs nIP is much larger than the average number of IPs n
c
IP
found in a chunk, and therefore cIP becomes large (it is unbounded above). The
same considerations apply to all the following metrics.
Change in the Set of Public Networks. While CDNs typically use IPs taken
from the same few public networks, malicious fast flux frequently introduce IPs
from new networks [22,35]. We measure the change in the set of public networks
by means of cnet = nnet/n
c
net − 1, where ncnet is the network-analogous of ncIP.
Change in the Set of ASs. The generalisation of the previous argument to
the next aggregation level brings us to the analysis of the changes in the number
of AS involved. We introduce therefore cAS = nAS/n
c
AS − 1, where ncAS is the
AS-analogous of ncIP.
Change in the Answer Length. Another relevant indicator is the change in
the number of IPs retrieved in each query [22,35]. We measure this change by
means of cal = mal/m
c
al − 1, where mcal is the mal-analogous of ncIP.
4.3 Fast Flux Domains Identification
A preliminary step for fast flux domains identification is the filtering of the
queries with dIP = 0, because this removes many false positives with no loss
in terms of true positives. The next step is the use of the metrics defined in
Sect. 4.2 to discriminate among malicious fast flux and CDN. Instead of using a
machine learning ‘black box’ classifier, we combine the indicators in a controlled
way, in order to encode some other domain knowledge and to allow for an easier
interpretation of the results. Foremost we aggregate the static and history-based
metrics separately, and finally we combine them into a single anomaly indicator
A, which can straightforwardly be used to classify the queries between fast flux
and legit domains.
Aggregation of the Static Metrics. We normalised the metrics nIP, nnet,
nAS, and mal in the interval [0,1], so that for all of them the value 0 corresponds
to a typical CDN, while 1 corresponds to the expected behaviour of a malicious
fast flux. This is achieved by means of a square-exponential scaling of the form
x −→ 1− e−( x−x0s )
2
, (5)
where x0 = 1 is the minimum value for the metric before the rescaling, s is
different for each metric and represents an intermediate scale between a typi-
cal CDN behaviour and a behaviour clearly ascribed to a malicious fast flux.7
7 The values of s were set based on information retrieved from the literature ([35]
and references therein) and the validation set. More in detail, we chose sIP = 24,
snet = 12, sAS = 6, and sal = 10.
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Equation 5 rescales x = x0 (i.e., the smallest possible value for x), x = s + x0
(i.e., a value intermediate between the typical CDN behaviour and the typical
malicious behaviour), and x  s (i.e., a value much larger than the scale s) to
0, 1/2, and 1 respectively.
After the scaling, all the quantities nIP, nnet, nAS, mal, fAS, and dIP are com-
parable: they take values in the interval [0,1] and for each of them a value close
to 0 denotes a typical CDN behaviour, while a value close to 1 indicates a very
suspicious behaviour. We combined these indicators with a weighted arithmetic
mean in a unique static index8
Astat = wIPnIP + wnetnnet + wASnAS + walmal + wffAS + wddIP. (6)
In order to avoid the evaluation of misleading indicators due to lack of data, the
metrics fAS and dIP are evaluated only if a minimum number of IPs is collected,
while mal is evaluated only if at least one answer contains more than one IP.
When one metric is absent, its value is set to 0 (in the absence of data we apply
a sort of ‘presumption of innocence’, to reduce false positives), its weight in the
evaluation of Astat is decreased by a factor 20 (because the innocence assessment
is only due to the absence of data), and the other weights are proportionally
rescaled so that
∑
i wi = 1.
Aggregation of the History-Based Metrics. As already mentioned, the
metrics cIP, cnet, cAS, and cal defined in Sect. 4.2 are unbounded above. We
normalise them in the interval [0,1] by means of Eq. 5 with x0 = 0 (as the
minimum value for these metrics before the rescaling is 0).9 After the rescaling,
all the metrics take values in the interval [0,1] and for each of them a value close
to 0 corresponds to a very stable behaviour, while a value close to 1 indicates a
behaviour with high variability over time. We combine then in a unique indicator
three of the history-based metrics (the fourth, i.e., cal is instead used in Eq. 8)
with a weighted arithmetic mean10
Adyn = w
′
IPcIP + w
′
netcnet + w
′
AScAS. (7)
Final Aggregation. We combine the indicators Astat, Adyn, and cal into a
single anomaly indicator A, which should be used to classify the queries between
fast flux and legit domains. In order to reduce false positives, we differentiate on
the basis of the quantity fAS, and we define
A =
{∑
i wiAi if fAS ≥ 0.5∏
i(Ai)
wi if fAS < 0.5
, (8)
8 The weights reflect the importance of the corresponding metric in the correct classi-
fication in the validation set; the optimal values are wIP = wnet = 0.03, wAS = 0.13,
wal = 0.09, wf = 0.54, and wd = 0.18.
9 The values of s were set based on information retrieved from the literature and the
validation set. More in detail, we chose sIP = snet = 1 and sAS = sal = 0.5.
10 The weights reflect the importance of the corresponding metric in the validation set;
the optimal values are w′IP = 0.07, w
′
net = 0.23, and w
′
AS = 0.7.
10 Lombardo, P., Saeli, S., et al.
where {Ai} = {Astat, Adyn, cal} and {wi} are the related weights.11 Analogously
to the averages in Eqs. 6 and 7, when one metric is absent, its value Ai is set
to 0 (not anomalous), its weigth wi is decreased by a factor 20, and the other
weights are proportionally rescaled so that
∑
j wj = 1.
Note that in Eq. 8 a (weighted) arithmetic mean is used when the AS-fraction
is large, while a (weighted) geometric mean is used when the AS-fraction is small;
this implies that in the latter case a value close to 0 for one of the indicators Ai
gives a stronger penalty to A.
The detection of malicious fast flux has thus been reduced to a very simple
one-dimension classification problem: only queries with A > Ath are labeled as
fast flux, where the optimal threshold (Ath = 0.25) has been found by maximiz-
ing the performance on the validation set. In order to increase the readability of
the results, we applied a sigmoid-shaped rescaling which maps A = 0 and A = 1
onto themselves and Ath onto 0.5.
5 Experimental Evaluation
The fast flux detection algorithm described in Sect. 4 was evaluated over a test
set comprising 30 days of ordinary traffic of the network described in Table 3
with the injection of fast flux traffic which covers all the most relevant fast flux
attack scenarios (see Table 4 for a complete list).
Table 3. Test-network description
30-days total one-hour average
N. of machines 391 -
N. of client machines 286 -
N. of connections 398 M 552 k
N. of resolved A-type DNS queries 75 M 104 k
N. of unique resolved A-type DNS queries 1.3 M 1.9 k
The fast flux traffic has been injected in the network via 47 pcaps — collected
from the public repositories [3,4,5] — which are associated with 9 different mal-
ware campaigns. Table 4 provides a brief description of each malware campaign
with the following information:
– the category, i.e., the malware type associated with the campaign
– the name of the campaign
– the list of the domains present in each pcap of the campaign, with the
anomaly indicator A associated by the algorithm to each of them
– the average value of A for each campaign
11 An optimisation procedure on the validation set produced similar weight for the
three quantities: wstat = 0.27, wdyn = 0.38, and wal = 0.35.
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In order to rule out overfitting, we used the test set (i.e., the network traffic
described in Table 3 and the pcaps described in Table 4) only to test the per-
formance of the algorithm, while we used another set (see Sect. 4) to define the
algorithm and the values of its parameters.
Table 4. Malware description (the underlined domains are farther analysed in Sect. 6)
Category Campaign Domains (A) 〈A〉
Banking
Trojan
ZBOT miscapoerasun.ws (0.85) 0.85
Banking
Trojan
Dreambot rahmatulahh.at (0.89); ardshinbank.at (0.92) 0.91
Banking
Trojan
Ursnif
widmwdndghdk.com (0.90); bnvmcnjghkeht.com (0.85);
qqweerr.com (0.85)
0.87
VBA
Dropper
Doc Dropper
Agenta
aassmcncnnc.com (0.90); iiieeejrjrjr.com (0.87);
ghmchdkenee.com (0.88)
0.88
Ransomware Locky
thedarkpvp.net (0.83); nsaflow.info (0.91); mrscrowe.net
(0.93); sherylbro.net (0.87); scottfranch.org (0.90);
gdiscoun.org (0.90)
0.89
Ransomware Nymaim
iqbppddvjq.com (0.91); danrnysvp.com (0.91);
pmjpdwys.com (0.93); vqmfcxo.com (0.86);
gbfeiseis.com (0.91); iuzngzhl.com (0.97);
vpvqskazjvco.com (0.84); jauudedqnm.com (0.93);
dtybgsb.com (0.93); tuzhohg.com (0.93);
sxrhysqdpx.com (0.86); arlfbqcc.com (0.93);
danrnysvp.com (0.87)
0.90
Banking
Trojan
Zeus Panda
farvictor.co (0.89); fardunkan.co (0.89); bozem.co
(0.84); farmacyan.co (0.87); fargugo.co (0.90);
manfam.co (0.85)
0.87
Banking
Trojan
GOZI ISFB
qdkngijbqnwehiqwrbzudwe.com (0.80);
jnossidjfnweqrfew.com (0.90); zxciuniqhweizsds.com
(0.86); huwikacjajsneqwe.com (0.92);
efoijowufjaowudawd.com (0.92);
onlyplacesattributionthe.net (0.90); nvvnfjvnfjcdnj.net
(0.86); popoiuiuntnt.net (0.89); zzzzmmmsnsns.net
(0.80); popooosneneee.net (0.83); liceindividualshall.net
(0.87); roborobonsnsnn.net (0.93)
0.87
Ransomware GandCrab zonealarm.bit (0.90) 0.90
a Doc.Dropper.Agent-6332127-0 [13]
Table 4 clearly shows that the proposed method successfully detected all the
fast flux domains with a high anomaly indicator. In fact the value of A averaged
over all campaigns is equal to 0.89.
In Table 5 we summarise the performance of the algorithm: in the second
column we consider the total number of outputs of the algorithm (i.e., the num-
ber of domains with A > 0) while in the third column we report the number of
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Table 5. Results
A > 0 A > 0.5
True Positives (TP ) 47 (100%) 47 (100%)
False Negatives (FN) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
False Positives (FP ) 6 (<0.001%) 4 (<0.001%)
outputs labeled as fast flux (i.e., the number of domains with A > 0.5). On the
rows we report the following quantities
– True Positives rate (TP ): the number of unique fast flux domains detected;
– False Negatives rate (FN ): the number of unique fast flux domains incorrectly
labeled as legit;
– False Positives rate (FP ): the number of unique legit domains incorrectly
labeled as fast flux.
All rates are given as absolute values and as percentages for each type on the
corresponding number of unique domains in input.
A remarkable result is the absence of false negatives: this determines in-
deed a 100% recall, also known as detection rate, R = TP /(TP + FN ). In or-
der to evaluate the algorithm also with a metric that takes into account the
false positives rate FP , we computed the F-score F = 2P R/(P + R) (where
P = TP /(TP + FP )), obtaining F = 95.9%.
As a comparison, [33] obtained R = 94.4% and F = 89.5% in their best
experimental result. We can therefore conclude that the proposed method is able
to detect queries to fast flux domains in a corporate network in near-real-time
and with high anomaly indicators, limiting false positives at the same time.
6 Fast Flux Service Networks Analysis
As an in-depth analysis of the algorithm described in Sect. 4, we examined the
IPs associated to a list of fast flux domains. The IPs were collected via active
DNS analysis and precisely with an FFSN-spanner which resolved systematically
domains taken from a list of malicious domains; these domains were gathered
via a scouting activity from the public repositories [3,4,5,6]. With the purpose
of hiding the FFSN-spanner activity from the bot herders, we randomized the
sequence of the queries and the waiting times among two subsequent queries,
while implementing an anonymization technique based on the use of the Tor
network. In order to overcome a limitation of the DNSPort resolver [14], which
returns only the first answer for domain lookup, we adopted ttdnsd, the Tor
TCP DNS Daemon. This solution allows for making arbitrary DNS requests
by converting any UDP request into a TCP connection, which is given to Tor
through the SOCKS port. The request is then forwarded anonymously through
the Tor network and reaches one of the ‘open’ recursive name servers via the
Tor Exit node.
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Fig. 1. Bipartite graph representing the IPs (small red circles) associated with each
domain (large green circle) in the pre-migration scenario. An arc indicates that the IP
has been given in answer to a query resolving the domain.
Over the period 09.03.2018–19.04.2018, we collected 10747 IPs associated
with 55 domains12: 7640 are fictitious IPs, related to the Nymaim campaign,
while the remaining 3017 IPs are likely associated with compromised hosts. The
IPs of the first group (Nymaim-fake-IPs), which are translated into real IPs13
by the decoder algorithm in the malware that use them [15], are strictly related
to the C&C Network described in [25]. The IPs of the latter group (real IPs)
showed instead a relevant change in the behaviour on the 26.03.2018: this was
probably the last part of the migration described in [2].
The pre-migration scenario is described in Fig. 1: it can be noted that dif-
ferent domains (large green circles) share some IPs (small red circles). In Fig. 2
we represent the overlap Oij among all the pairs (i, j) of the top 16 domains
observed before the migration (excluded the ones associated with the Nymain
12 Some domains are reported in Table 4, others in Fig. 2; the remaining domains
are odqndpqowdnqwpodn.com, moncompte-carrefour.org, 0768.ru, allianzbank.org,
commerzb.co, db-ag.co, druhok.com, form.xbeginner.org, ihalbom.com, ingdi-
rectverifica.com, lloyds-personal.com, mein-advanzia.info, point.charitablex.org,
postofficegreat.com, ransomware.bit, redluck0.com, safe.bintrust.org, sunyst.co,
dfplajngru.com, mer.arintrueed.org, www.ico-teleqram.net, clo.arotamarid.org,
www.translationdoor.com, vr-b.co, vr-b.cc.
13 An analysis on some pcaps associated with iuzngzhl.com, arlfbqcc.com, and
vpvqskazjvco.com revealed that the corresponding real IPs are based on the San-
diFlux FFSN described below.
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campaign), defined as
Oij =
|Xi ∩Xj |
|Xi ∪Xj | , (9)
where Xi is the pool of IPs associated with the i-th domain and |X| is the the
cardinality of X.
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Fig. 2. Overlap representation Oij (defined in Eq. 9) among all the pairs (i, j) of the
top 16 domains (for number of retrieved IPs) in the pre-migration scenario. Darker
tones represent larger overlaps.
Both Figs. 1 and 2 show a clear subdivision of the domains in two indepen-
dent clusters. The analysis of the fast flux domains revealed that the clusters
correspond to two large FFSNs, namely Dark Cloud (on the left in Figs. 1 and 2)
and SandiFlux (on the right). Indeed, in the first cluster we recognised domains
associated with Dumps Stores that leverage Dark Cloud [21], while in the lat-
ter we found domains associated with the GandCrab campaigns, which leverage
SandiFlux [2]. It is worth noting that the sets of IPs in the two FFSNs that we
identified are highly overlapped, but no IP is shared among the two groups.
The pre-migration subdivision in two different FFSNs is reflected in the dif-
ferent geolocation of the relative IPs: Fig. 3 shows that, while the IPs retrieved
from SandiFlux are mainly localised in central-east Europe, the ones retrieved
from Dark Cloud are based in eastern Europe and Russia.
After the migration all the domains appeared to leverage a unique FFSN,
which we recognised as SandiFlux. In Fig. 4 we further investigate the top 5
countries represented before the migration (on the left) and after (on the right):
Ukraine and Russia confirmed to be the most represented countries in Dark
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Fig. 3. Geolocation of the IPs retrieved for the FFSNs before the migration
Cloud [21], while SandiFlux’s IPs are found mainly in Romania and Bulgaria
both before and after the migration. Figures 3 and 4 are based on the IP-geoloc
tables downloaded from Maxmind [12].
The FFSNs described above are a good testing ground for the metrics in-
troduced in Sect. 4.2: in Table 6 we report a summary of some of these metrics
evaluated over the FFSNs and three large CDNs. Note that two of the CDNs
we observed (namely, www.nationalgeographic.it and cdn.wetransfer.net) have a
very large number of IPs, making thus nIP a misleading indicator in these cases.
This is not a problem for the proposed algorithm, since, as explained in Sect. 4,
nIP is used in combination with many other metrics.
Table 6. Summary of some relevant metrics
nIP nAS n
resc
IP n
resc
AS c
resc
AS f
resc
AS dIP
Dark Cloud 1276 221 1 1 1 1 1.1 10−3
SandiFlux 1831 354 1 1 1 1 1.3 10−3
Nymaim-fake-IPs 7640 1767 1 1 1 1 0.77
www.nationalgeographic.it 2589 1 1 0 0 0 2.8 10−6
cdn.wetransfer.net 2852 1 1 0 0 0 3.1 10−6
neo4j.com 33 1 0.83 0 0 0 5.8 10−4
In Fig. 5 we represent the histogram of the frequencies of the first byte in the
IP-pool of SandiFlux and Nymaim-fake-IPs and one medium-size CDN. A clear
16 Lombardo, P., Saeli, S., et al.
0
250
500
750
Uk
rai
ne
Ru
ssi
a
Ro
ma
nia
Bu
lga
ria
Ma
ce
do
nia
n
IP
Dark cloud (pre)
0
100
200
300
Ro
ma
nia
Bu
lga
ria
Hu
ng
ary
Po
lan
d
Ch
ile
n
IP
SandiFlux (pre)
0
200
400
600
Ro
ma
nia
Bu
lga
ria
Hu
ng
ary
Po
lan
d
Ma
ce
do
nia
n
IP
SandiFlux (post)
Fig. 4. Histogram of the number of IPs localised in the top 5 countries before the
migration (on the left) and after (on the right)
.
difference between botnets can be noticed, in particular among the Nymaim-fake-
IPs, where the IP-distribution is not so far from a uniform random distribution
and the CDN ‘imap.gmail.com’, where the IP-distribution has a few high peaks.
Figure 5 clearly shows that simple indicators as the mean and the variance (rep-
resented by the corresponding Gaussian distribution) do not catch the nature of
the distribution, while the metric dIP defined in Eq. 3 is much more appropriate.
In particular dIP = 1.3 10
−3 for SandiFlux and dIP = 0.77 for Nymaim-fake-IPS,
while the CDN ‘imap.gmail.com’ has dIP = 5.0 10
−8. Note that the encoding of
the IPs is not a problem for the detection algorithm: in fact it increases the IP
dispersion, thus fastening the detection.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a fast flux detection method based on the passive
analysis of the DNS traffic of a corporate network. The analysis is based on
aramis security monitoring system. The proposed solution has been evaluated
over the LAN of a company, with the injection of 47 pcaps associated with 9
different malware campaigns that leverage FFSNs and cover a wide variety of
attack scenarios. All the fast flux domains were detected with a very low false
positive rate and the comparison of performance indicators with a state-of-the-
art work shows a remarkable improvement. An in-depth active analysis of a list
of malicious fast flux domains confirmed the reliability of the metrics used in the
proposed algorithm and allowed for the identification of more than 10000 IPs,
some of which are likely associated with compromised hosts. These IPs turned
out to be part of two notorious botnets, namely Dark Cloud and SandiFlux, to
the description of which we therefore contribute.
As a future development, we plan to introduce in the algorithm a metric
related to the use of reserved IPs, which we observed to be extensively present
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Fig. 5. Histogram of the frequencies of the first byte in the IP-pool associated with
two groups of fast flux domains and with one large CDN (bin-size=2)
in SandiFlux. Another planned development is the inspection of the overlap in
terms of IPs among the most suspicious domains, as we saw that many IPs are
shared among domains in the same FFSN.
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